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"A class action is an illustration of a situation where it is not feasible
for all persons whose interests may be affected by an action to be made
parties to it. It was invented by equity for situations in which the number of persons having substantially identical interests in the subject matter of litigation is so great that it is impracticable to join all of them as
parties, in accordance with the usual rules of procedure, and in which
an issue is raised which is common to all of such persons."'
Strange as it may seem, however, the -problem of the class suit and its
effect upon the members of the class involved have not been thoroughly
analyzed by many writers. Though much has been written on the subject
the commentators do not get down to bed rock in their analyses; instead
they seem to accept without question the theories of Moore or. Blume or
Street, the modern pioneers in this wilderness.
The existing confusion and uncertainty surrounding the nature of the class
action, and the failure of this procedural device to accomplish the ends
of which it is capable, suggest that a critical inquiry into the present-day
doctrines of the class suit might well be in order, and that attention might
well be given to the drawbacks, as well as the merits, of the reasoning which
these three writers have developed.
Street's View
Street divides class suits into what he calls two '.radically different
types."
The "true," which he describes this way:
"In the first type, which is that of the true class suit, it will be found
that the subject-matter of the suit is a fund or property over which the
court can and does acquire an effective jurisdiction by the joining of
*The writers of this piece have had the benefit of an unpublished study by Dean
Robert S. Stevens on class suits. We have also profited from his reading and criticism
of our manuscript. Our debt to him is very great and we take this way of inadequately
expressing it. We also wish to acknowledge that in writing this piece we have had the
aid of the prior research of Professor Keeffe for the Law Revision Commssion of the
State of New York, published in N. Y. LEG. Doc. 1942 No. 65 (J), p. 73.
'RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 86, comment b (1942).
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some persons as plaintiffs or defendants who may be considered representative of all those who are interested in the same fund or property."2
and the "spurious," which he describes this way:
"In the other type of cases, the suit is not concerned with a fund or
property at all, but with a personal liability. Here the suit is not a class
suit in any proper sense. We may call it the spurious class suit. Illustrations of this type of suit are found in suits by or against involuntary
associations brought in respect of some legal liability or against numerous
defendants to enjoin a threatened injury. Suits for injunction against
strikes and other forms of combinations resulting in interference with
trade or business fall within this class when they are prosecuted in the
form of class suits. It is not even necessary in such cases that the numerous .defendants should comprise any formal aggregate or association of
persons." 3
Blume's View
Blume's leading article on representative suits appeared in 1932. 4 In it,
under the subheading "Not True Representative Suits-( ?)," he wrote:
"There is doubt as to whether a suit brought by one or more of a
class for the benefit of all, when each could have sued alone, is, in any
proper sense, a representative suit." 5
After quoting Clark6 and Street, presenting the view that it is not, Blume
states:
"It can be argued, however, that a suit by one of a class for the benefit
of all, when each could have sued alone, is a true representative suit because other members of the class are-or should be-estopped from
bringing later suits for the'7 same relief if they knew of the representative
suit in time to intervene."
But unfortunately the merits of that argument are not further considered
in the article, for it continues:
"But even if the view be taken that there is no representation, the fact
remains that there are many situations in which one or more may bring
a suit in the form of a representative suit although joinder is deemed permissive and not required. By suing for all, the plaintiff who starts the
342 (1909).
sIbid.
4
Blume, The "Common Questions" Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Suits, 30 lxicn. L. Rav. 878 (1932).
6
1d. at 897.
6
CLARK, CODE PLEADING 280, n. 202 (1928).
'Blume, The "Common Questionsz" Principle in the Code Provision for Representative Sits, 30 MIcu. L. Rav. 878, 898 (1932).
21 STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRACTICE
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suit invitesthe others to come in, and his statement that he sues for
himself and others like situated is neither false nor absurd and should
not be ignored as surplusage. If the term 'representative' is unsatisfactory, the suit might be called 'an action inviting joinder.' "
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
It was after Blume wrote that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
drafted to become effective in 1938. The draftsmen of the Rules studied the
problem and the result of their research is Rule 23, which so far as pertinent
reads:
"(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous
as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of
them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation
of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the
right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner
of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the
class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of
claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the
action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought." 9
Moore's View
Moore, in his treatise on the Federal Rules, explains the basis of Rule 23's
division of class suits into the three types, "true," "hybrid," and "spurious."' 1°
81bid.
9
FFD. R. Civ. P., 23(a), 28 U. S. C. foil. § 723c (1940).
10 "lt may be salutary and perhaps refreshing to pause for a moment to write an
epitaph for Moore's accursed labels, 'true,' 'hybrid,' and 'spurious.' It may be a matter of concern only to the purist that this terminology is ludicrous and that the
plaintiff must stubbornly insist that he has a spurious suit against the equally stubbbrn
insistence of the defendant that it is not spurious; it may be a matter of concern only
to the West Publishing Company that the phrase 'spurious class suit held maintainable'
must now appear in head notes; it may be a matter of concern only to the logician
that we are given three species of class suits the first of which is really a class suit, the
second' of which is partly a class suit, and the last of which isn't a class suit at all;
but it is a matter of general concern that so perverse a value judgment is expressed by
this application of the terms 'true' and 'spurious' to suits of equivalent social importance
and function. Given the penchant of the legal mind for psittacistic repetition of labelsres gestae, res ipsa loquitur, champerty and maintenance, or power coupled with an
interest, for example-it is imperative that the class suit of sub-paragraph (a) (3) be
saved from the damnation of the faint, faint praise carried by the word 'spurious'."
Kalven and Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Functionr of the Class Suit, 8 U. OF CHi. L.
REv. 684, 707 n. 73 (1941).
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"The classification which the rule Rule 23 makes is dependent upon
the jural relationships of the members of the class. The jurisdictional
requisites and the effect of the judgment, though not stated by the rule,
vary, also,, with the type of class action. For these reasons it is advisable to designate the actions in three groups."
-(1)
The True Class Suit.
"Various tests have been proposed to determine whether a suit was a
true class action ....

These efforts . . . are ...

significant. They illus-

trate the desire of courts to find a unity of interests between the parties.
This can be expressed better in terms of joinder. The 'true class suit'
is one wherein, but for the class action device, the joinder of all interested persons would be essential. This would be in cases where the right
sought to be enforced was joint, common or derivative ......
-(2) The Hybrid Class Action.
"This action is unique, but its importance is decreasing. Though the
class has a mutuality of interests in the question involved, still the rights
of the members of the class are neither joint nor common; they are several. In addition to the question of fact common to all, there is, in lieu
of joint or common interests, the presence of property which calls for
distribution or management. This type of action is exemplified by a
creditor's bill for the appointment of a receiver ....,,12
-(3)
The Spurious Class Suit.
"This.is a permissive joinder device. The presence of numerous persons interested in a common question of law or fact warrants its use by
persons desiring to clean up a litigious situation. Assume that a railroad
negligently sets fire to property, and widespread damage to many property owners ensues. Here there is a question of law or fact common to
many persons. .

...
,13

The Theories in Action
To bring more sharply into focus the distinctions which Street and Moore
attempt to draw, consider the following situations:
(1) A sues on behalf of himself and other similarly situated members
of a fraternal benefit society to enjoin the society and its officers from
using the society's funds as they propose to do under a plan to reorganize
14
the society.
Unfortunately the epitaph has been sounded prematurely. The "accursed labels"
show signs of living to a ripe old age.
112 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTI6E 2235 (1938).
121d. at 2239.
'B1d.at 2241.
' 4 Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338 (1921), is a
landmark case in the class suit field. The Tribe was an Indiana fraternal benefit asso-
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(2) The church of which B is a member splits into two groups. B sues
orA behalf of himself and other similarly situated members of one of the
groups to establish that group's claim to a pro rata share of the funds held
by the parent church.' 5
ciation with thousands of members scattered throughout the United States. When its
officers adopted a plan of reorganizing the society in order to prevent its threatened in-

solvency and disruption, there was dissatisfaction among the membership. 524 of. the
dissatisfied Class A members of the Tribe, all nonresidents of Indiana, brought suit
in federal court in Indiana against the Supreme Tribe and its officers, who were all
Indiana citizens. The suit was a class suit, brought and prosecuted for the benefit
of all members of Class A, who numbered over 70,000 and, attacking the reorganization
plan, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the improper use by defendants of Tribe trust funds, "in
which all the complainants and other members of Class A . . . had a common and indivisible interest."
A hearing was had before a master, and his report included the finding that the
suit was a true class suit, "presenting questions of common interest to all the members
of Class A and affecting their joint interests in funds and in internal management of
the society." The decree entered by the district court dismissed complainants' bill for
want of equity, and no appeal was taken.
No Class A member residing in Indiana intervened in that suit at any time. Nowhere
in the reports is it indicated that they, or indeed any other Class A members, received
formal notice of the suit or had actual notice of its pendency. Four years later, however, the Indiana Class A members were heard from, for acting on the theory that the
prior suit had not determined their rights, they started actions similar to it in the Indiana state courts.
The Tribe applied to federal district court in Indiana for an ancillary bill to enjoin
the state court actions, asserting that the state court plaintiffs were bound by the
dismissal decree entered in the earlier suit. The district court denied the injunction,
reasoning that since diversity jurisdiction would have been lacking if they had been
parties, they were not bound by the dismissal.
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, squarely holding that the class suit decree was
conclusive on all members of Class A. The Court relied on the character of the right involved in that suit and buttressed its reasoning by mention of the deletion of the last sentence of old Equity Rule 38. The rule read: "When the question is one of common or general interest to many persons constituting.a class so numerous as to make it impracticable
to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole." As
the rule had formerly read it contained also the following provision: ". . . but in such cases
the decree shall be without prejudice to the rights and claims of the absent parties."
The Court pointed out that it would be an unfortunate state of affairs if the Indiana
citizens were not concluded by the decree while all other Class A members were, for

then the rights of most of the class might be determined by a decree rendered on a
theory which might later be repudiated in another forum as to a part of the same class.
A class suit decree, said the Court, must bind all of the class properly represented else
the federal courts will not have the jurisdiction in class suits to which they are obviously entitled, and it gave the illustrations of the shareholder, the creditor, and the
person not yet in esse being bound by decrees of representative actions involving
their rights.
1'Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 14 L. Ed. 942 (U. S. 1853). After the division
of the Methodist Episcopal Church into two branches, a suit was brought on behalf of
the southern branch to establish its right to an interest in the funds of the "Book
Concern." The Book Concern had been established by the traveling preachers of the
church prior to its division. They had used their own capital, their primary idea being to
disseminate religious knowledge. It was early decided, however, to devote the profits
to the relief of traveling, aged, and supernumerary preachers and their families. Through
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(3) C sues on behalf of himself and other similarly situated taxpayers
to enjoin a revenue commissioner from collecting a certain tax alleged to
be unconstitutional. 16
the labor of all the ministers the Book Concern had grown to be worth about $200,000
at the time of suit.
The persons named as plaintiffs were preachers in the southern church, and, as such,
interested in the fund. They sued on behalf of themselves and the many hundred other
preachers of the southern division. The preachers of the northern church, the adverse
dlaimants, were also numerous, and a few of them were made defendants as representative of all. There is no indication that notice of the suit was given to the preachers
having an interest in the fund's disposition.
It was held that the bill presented a proper case where some might sue on behalf
of all interested in the one subject matter, and where some might be sued as representatives of many. In discussing this point the Court said:
"Where the parties interested in the suit are numerous, their rights and liabilities
are so subject to change and fluctuation by death or otherwise, that it would not be
possible, without very great inconvenience, to make all of them parties, and would
oftentimes prevent the prosecution of the suit to a hearing. For convenience, therefore,
and to prevent a failure of justice, a court of equity permits a portion of the parties
in interest to represent the entire body, and the decree binds all of them the same as
if all were before the court. The legal and equitable rights and liabilities of all being
before the court by representation, and especially where the subject-matter of the suit
is common to all, there can be very little danger but that the interest of all will be
properly protected and maintained.
"The case in hand illustrates the propriety and fitness of the rule. There are some
fifteen hundred persons represented by the complainants, and over double that number
by the defendants. It is manifest that to require all the parties to be brought upon the
record, as is required in a suit at law, would amount to a denial of justice. The right
may be defeated by objections to-parties, from the difficulty of ascertaining them, or
if ascertained, from the changes constantly occurring by death or otherwise." 16 How.
288, 303, 14 L. Ed. 942, 948 (U. S. 1853).
16In Gramling v. Maxwell, 52 F. 2d 256 (W. D. N. C. 1931), the facts were these:
Gramling, a South Carolina peach grower, operated 100 trucks for a part of each year
selling peaches throughout the western part of North Carolina. He had no place of
business in the latter state, but simply peddled the peaches as best he could directly
from the trucks.
A North Carolina statute provided that any person not maintaining a permanent
place of business in the state who sold fresh produce must pay a $50 license tax for
each truck he operated in North Carolina. The statute then went on to state,-however,
that the tax should not apply to persons selling produce grown in North Carolina.
When the North Carolina revenue commissioner, Maxwell, sought to enforce the tax
against Gramling, the latter brought suit in federal court on behalf of himself and all
others similarly situated to enjoin its collection. The three-judge court declared the
tax unconstitutional as a burden on interstate commerce and enjoined defendant from
enforcing the tax against plaintiff and the others on whose behalf the suit was prosecuted.
One of the main contentions of the defendant was that North Carolina provided an
adequate remedy at law for plaintiff, for he might have paid the tax under protest
and sued for its recovery with interest, and therefore there was no basis for federal
equity jurisdiction. In answer to this the court said:
"The case is not one, however, involving merely the right of a single taxpayer. It
is a class suit instituted in behalf of a large number of peach growers affected by the
statute; and we think that it may be maintained in equity for the purpose of avoiding
the multiplicity of suits which would otherwise result. Whatever may have been the
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(4) D sues on behalf of himself and other signers of a restrictive cove7
nant to enjoin X, also a signer, from breaking the covenant.'
Many other examples could be set forth, but these four nicely illustrate the
basis of the problem that is fundamental and is the test of the appropriateness of a class suit-the effect of the judgment. In cases (1) and (2) the
judgment will be binding on the entire class, according to Moore and Street,
while only those who actually bring or intervene in the suit will be concluded by the judgment in cases (3) and (4). Cases (1) and (2) are "true"
class suits, it is reasoned, because the judgment will bind all members of
the class whether actual parties or not, while cases (3) and (4) are merely
"spurious" class suits because, it is assumed, the judgment cannot be binding upon all members of the class but can be conclusive against only those
who were actual parties.
Are the Present Distinctions Justifiable or Desirable?
But a little reflection would seem to indicate that there are more than
surface similarities between the examples posed. Each instance presents
a picture of one individual suing on behalf of himself and of the class of
which he is a member to ascertain and determine the answers to questions
in which, it is reasonable to assume, each member of that class has a direct
interest. In each instance there is the same possibility of inadequate representation of the class" interests by the party bringing the suit, the same
opportunity for a bad-faith settlement by that party, and the same chance that
certain of the class on whose behalf the suit is allegedly brought would prefer, in reality, that it not be brought or even that it turn out "against" them.
In each case there is one question (or several related questions) of law or
fact upon which the result turns and which, logically, should be capable of
more thorough and satisfactory determination in one single suit in which
the views and arguments of all may be put forward than in several suits,
the results of which may even be completely opposite determinations as to
rule formerly as to the right to maintain a class suit of this character in the federal
courts, we think that, since the adoption of the 38th Equity Rule (28 U.S.C.A. § 723),
the right to maintain such a suit cannot be denied .... And, if such a suit may be maintained, there can be no question but that it is speedier, more efficacious, and more satisfactory for all parties concerned than the institution of a hundred or more actions at
law for the recovery of taxes paid under protest. The remedy provided by the statute
cannot, therefore, in view of the situation, be deemed an adequate remedy as compared
with the suit in equity which eliminates so much useless and cumbersome litigation."
52 F.
2d 256, 260 (W. D. N. C. 1931).
17 Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 61 Sup. Ct. 115 (1940), discussed in text at notes
28-33 infra.
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the rights of members of one and the same class. The party or parties who
oppose the interests of the class would seem to desire final settlement of
the basic issue in a single suit as much in one of the four instances as in
another; and in each situation there would seem to be the same degree of
public interest in avoiding unnecessary litigation and in bringing to an end
in an efficient and economical fashion such litigation as there must be.
Yet the judgment binds the class in some cases and not in others; and
whether it does or not is dependent, according to Moore, on the "jural relationships"' 8 of the members of the class and the subject-matter of the action.
If this means anything it must mean that the binding effect of the judgment
depends upon whether the character of the right sought to be enforced is
joint, common, or several.
But granting that there exist in the law examples of distinctions based on
differences among jural relationships, does it necessarily follow that we must
make distinctions on this basis as to the binding effect of class suit judgments? In other words (and without essaying facetiousness), granting that a
black dog can be distinguished from a white one, the distinction is of no
force when the necessity of obtaining a dog license arises. Is there not
danger of falling into an attitude of unthinking formalism, like that of the
old common law, when we start assuming that all legal distinctions are
meritorious in and of themselves and forget that they should be constantly
examined in the light of the purpose they were originally drawn to serve?
The four illustrative cases which were presented above to hid in the consideration of possible class suit distinctions may strike a responsive chord
in many memories. Three of them are leading cases from the United States
Supreme Court. Example (3) is not, but it is the case of Gramling v. Maxwell,' 9 ideal for the purposes of discussion because it is one of four cases
cited by the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules as illustrative of
20
the "spurious" class suit.

The "True" Class Suit Versus the "Spurious"
Example (3) should be carefully compared with example (1), the wellknown Ben Hur case. 2 1 In the latter case, the Class A members who sued
sought to enforce their right not to have funds of the association misapplied;
' 8 The jural relationships determine which of the three types a particular class suit
is, and the type it is determines the binding effect of the judgment. 2 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE 2235, 2283 et seq. (1938).
1952 F. 2d 256 (W. D. N. C. 1931). See hote 16 supra.
20
See Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3), 28 U. S. C. foil.
§ 723c (1940).
21255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338 (1921). See note 14 supra.
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the former case, i.e., Grainling v. Maxrwell, was an attempt to uphold the right
not to be subjected to an invalid tax. Is the right in the former any more or
less "common" than that in the latter? In each case, an individual member
of the class might have waived his right without prejudice to other members of the class. In the Ben Hur case, the right of a Class A member would
depend upon the validity of his membership or policy, which would in turn
be subject to attack on the ground of fraud against him individually and
without reference to other members of the class. As a matter of fact, the
South Carolina peach growers in the Gramling case may fairly be said to
have a right among them which is, if anything, more "common" than that
of the Class A members, for it would seem that the status of all the class
depends upon the answer to a single question-whether the tax is a burden
on interstate commerce-and it would seem that once that question is determined favorably for the class there would be no occasion for raising any
22
question peculiar to only one of the class.

Nor does it seem sound to attempt to distinguish the rights of the Class A
members from those of the peach growers on the ground that the former
'grew out of a single transaction. However single and unified we might
be willing to call a transaction which is really a series of separate contracts
22
That the courts themselves have been unable to differentiate clearly between the
various classifications of class suits as outlined by Moore 'is well illustrated by the
opinion of Judge Goodrich of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Pentland v. Dravo Corp., 152 F. 2d 851 (C. C. A. 3d 1945). There, the suit was brought
under the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act and in the course of his opinion
Judge Goodrich discusses the distinctions betveen the various types of class suits.
Judge Goodrich starts off by stating, with apparent approval, the Judgments Restatement's illustration of what he terms a trud class suit, namely, that of a taxpayer "who
sues county tax assessors on behalf of himself and all other taxpayers alleging that
his assessment is invalid because a wrong method of assessment was used." He then
goes on to state that Moore gives an "explicit answer" as to when we have a "true" class
action. Yet Moore, upon whom Judge Goodrich relies, places the taxpayer suit in
the "spurious" category. (See Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (a) (3),
28 U. S. C. foil. § 723c (1940), and 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACICE 2243, 2244 (1938),
referring to Gramling v. Maxwell, note 16 supra, as "spurious." Gramling v. Maxwell
seems indistinguishable from the illustration offered by the Judgments Restatement.) In
other words, Moore and the Restatement disagree and Judge Goodrich seems to cite
both with complete confidence.
The result of such confusion is that neither parties nor their attorneys can determine in advance of a court decision in their case into which category their action is to
be placed. Also there arise cases, such as Matlaw Corp. v. War Damage Corp., 164
F. 2d 281 (C. C. A. 7th 1947), which must wrestle with the "spurious"-"true" and
"spurious"-"hybrid" distinctions in order to decide whether a federal court has jurisdiction-since in the "true" class action the claims may be aggregated in order to
satisfy the requisite jurisdictional amount while in the "spurious" they may not be.
The obvious solution to the problem is to abolish the arbitrary distinctions among
class suits and allow the rights of all the members of the class to be determined in one
action.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 33

between members and Tribe, we would seem forced to admit that the passage
of the tax statute in issue in the Gramling case is no less a single transac23

tion.

The "Hybrid" Class Suit Versus the "Spurious"
The distinction between the "hybrid" and the "spurious" suit is likewise
a will-o'-the-wisp. Indeed under Moore's analysis the "hybrid" is merely
a "spurious" suit with a fund attached ;24 but under no analysis can it be
said that the presence or absence of a specific fund has any connection with
what we may call the "abstract rights" of the parties. The reason for making
a distinction based on the fund is a procedural rather than a substantive one,
rather one of form than of substance, rather based on the supposed requirements of due process than on any careful, logical analysis of the rights
of the parties.2 5 A legal wrong gives rise to a cause of action for damages
springing from the wrong. Many persons may have the identical cause of
action, arising from the same wrong. The right to come against the fund
arises from a wrong-and that wrong is the same and gives rise to the same
26
cause of action whether there is or is not a fund.
23
"Oneness" of subject matter-whether based on the existence of a fund or of
"common" or "joint" or "derivative" rights in controversy-has been premised as underlying the rule that the "true" and the "hybrid" class suits determine the rights of all
of the class. But is there any less a "oneness" in the "spurious" suit?
A valid answer to those who assert there is would seem to be found in the opinion
by Judge Evans in Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 125 F. 2d 84 (C. C. A. 7th 1941). That
case was a civil statutory action by two jobbers of gasoline, on their own behalf and as
representatives of a class of 900 jobbers, to recover treble damages for injuries allegedly caused by an unlawful combination to fix gasoline prices. The court stated that the
action could have been maintained as a class action had plaintiffs shown they ade-

quately represented the interests of the class. Failure of such a showing, however, required dismissal of the action as a class action, though it could of course-continue as
an individual action. The defendants asserted that the action could not in any case be
brought as a "spurious" class suit, since there was lacking a "common question"; but
the court went out of its way to answer that argument and in showing the presence of
a "common question" it so described the rights involved as to indicate they were indistinguishable from "joint or common!' rights:
"The statutory tort, incidental to a criminal conspiracy, is a single thing, a single
wrong, and though a compound of many acts and persons, it has a singleness of object,
an integral core.
"The illegal conspiracy gives rise to one statutory cause of action for damages incident to the violation of law. Many persons may have the identical cause of action, arising
from the same wrong, but varying in scope of damage to each, depending upon the
effect of the illezal act upon the individual." 125 F. 2d 84, 88 (C. C. A. 7th 1941).
242 MVOORE'S FEDERAL
25

PRAcTicE 2239, 2240 (1938).

Unquestionably a fund case is procedurally different in that there is in ren jurisdiction which supports service of process outside the territorial limits of the court that
holds
2 6 the fund.
See Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances v. Deckert, 123 F. 2d 979, 983 (C. C. A. 3d
1941), discussed in note 42 infra.
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Has Not Hausberry v. Lee Reversed the Ben Hur Case?

To state that the judgment in a "true" class action binds all members of
the class because the rights of all of the members of the class are before
the court,27 is to beg the question in issue. What brings the rights of a party
before a court? Members of a "spurious" class who know an action is being
brought to litigate questions affecting their rights and who expressly or by
silence assent to the named plaintiff's statement that he represents them
would seem to have placed their rights before the court in a much dlearer
fashion than members of a "true" class who never hear of the action until
judgment has been entered. And yet the latter class is bound by the judgment, at least under the Advisory Committee's interpretation of the Beun Hvr
case, in which, it is to be recalled, there was no showing that notice was
ever given to any of the class other than the named plaintiffs.
It seems unlikely, however, that the Ben Hur case, were it to come up for
the first time today, would reach the same result, for its doctrine as to res
judicata seems irreconcilable with the position of the Supreme Court in the
case of Hansberry v. Lee,281 illustration (4), above.
In the Hansberry case several hundred white property owners had entered into a restrictive covenant against negro occupation of property in
their subdivision. The restrictive covenant was to become effective only if
owners of 95% of the frontage signed it. In 1934 Mrs. Burke, one of the
signers, sued on behalf of herself and others similarly situated to enjoin
a violation of the covenant. It was stipulated by the defendant that the
required 95% had signed the covenant, and the case went to the chancellor
on an agreed statement of facts, the only issue being whether local conditions
had so changed as to render the covenant inequitable. The chancellor held
29
they had not and granted the injunction.
Five years later Mrs. Lee, another party to the covenant, sued on behalf
of herself and others similarly situated to enjoin another violation of the
covenant, but this time the defendants set up the defense, and the chancellor
found, that owners of the required 95% of the frontage had never signed
the covenant. Despite this finding the chancellor ruled that the covenant
was valid and in force because all of the property owners were bound by
the decree in Burke v. Kleiman,3a which was a class suit and hence res
27

See Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 303, 14 L. Ed. 942, 948 (U. S. 1853).

28311 U. S. 32, 61 Sup. Ct. 115 (1940).
29
Burke v. Kleiman, 277 Ill. App. 519 (1934).
30277 Ill. App. 519 (1934). See note 29 supra.
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judicata as to the 'whole class. The chancellor's decree was affirmed' by the
Supreme Court of Illinois.3 1
The Stipreme Court of the United States, however, reversed, 32 on the
ground that it was a denial of due process to hold that all members of the
class were bound by the decree in the first action.
"It is one thing to say that some members of a class may represent
other members in a litigation where the sole and common interest of the
class in the litigation, is either to assert a common right or to challenge
an asserted obligation. Smith v. Swormstedt, supra; Supreme Tribe
of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, supra. . . It is quite another to hold that all
those who are free alternatively either to assert rights or to challenge
them are of a single class, so that any group, merely because it is of the
class so constituted, may be deemed adequately to represent any others
of the class in litigating their interests in either alternative."33
But does the Court mean to base its holding on the distinction attempted to be drawn 'in the above paragraph? It is submitted it does not,
because the distinction is one without substance. There is no such thing as
a class action in which it can be said that each and every one of the absent
members-those without notice of the proceedings-wishes the representatives of the class to assert a right in his behalf. Is it conceivable that every
one of the 70,000 Class A members in the Ben Hur case desired to have
the Tribe's officers enjoined from proceeding with the planned reorganization? It would seem more than likely that some of the class wished the Tribe's
finances to be on a sound basis even if it might cost them some loss of benefits or standing relative to other classes of membership of the Tribe. At any
rate, it seems fallacious to assume without inquiry that 70,000 people agreed,
even in general, with the representatives who brought the suit.
Could not the language of the Supreme Court in the Hansberry case be
applied with equal facility to the Ben Hur case-i.e., should not the Class A
members have been considered as "free alternatively either to assert rights or
to challenge them"? One is hard put to understand how the Supreme Court
can say that the Burke v. Kleiman judgment did not bind the entire class
because some of the class might not have wished to uphold the covenant had
they been parties in that earlier action, and at the same time cite as authority the Ben Hur case where it is just as likely that some of the class
might not have wished to attack the planned reorganization of the Tribe.
It would seem accurate to say that the fundamental reason why the
31
Lee
32

v. Hansberry, 372 Ill. 369, 24 N. E. 2d 37 (1939).
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 61 Sup. Ct. 115 (1940).
33Id. at 44, 61 Sup. Ct. at 119.
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Supreme Court of Illinois was reversed in the Hansberry case-though imperfectly expressed-was that the lack of notice to all members of the class
in Burke v. Kleiman precluded the decree in that suit from binding the entire class. That the Burke case decree would have been res judicata as to
the class had notice been given is indicated by the following statements from
the Supreme Court's opinion:
"Nevertheless, there is scope within the framework of the Constitution for holding in appropriate cases that a judgment rendered in a class
suit is res judicata as to members of the class who are not formal parties tQ the suit. Here; as elsewhere, the Fourteenth Amendment does not
compel state courts or legislatures to adopt any particular rule for establishing the conclusiveness of judgments in class suits; .

.

. nor does it

compel the adoption of the particular rules thought by this Court to be
appropriate for the federal courts. With a proper regard for divergent
local institutions and interests, .

.

. this court is justified in saying that

there has been a failure of due process only in those cases where it canprotection of
not be said that the procedure adopted, fairly insures '3the
4
the interests of absent parties who are to be bound by it."

The Court then made this most significant statement:
"Nor do we find it necessary for the decision of this case to say that,
when the only circumstance defining the class is that the determination
of the rights of its members turns upon a single issue of fact or law, a
state could not constitutionally adopt a procedure whereby some of the
members of the class could stand in judgment for all, provided that the
procedure were so devised and applied as to insure that those present
are of the same class as those absent and that the litigation is so conducted as to insure the full and fair consideration of the common
issue."3 5
The paragraph immediately above clearly refers to the "spurious" class,
and thus Hairsberry v. Lee may well be termed a standing invitation to
Congress and the states to do something about class suit judgments-particularly the judgments in the "spurious" class suits. It is unfortunate that
in eight years the invitation has not been accepted.
Class Suits and the Statute of Limitations
A problem that cannot be avoided in any discussion of class suits is that
of the statute of limitations. Assume A brings a class suit on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated. Before trial the statutory period of
34M. at 42, 61 Sup. Ct. at 118.
35M. at 43, 61 Sup. Ct. at 119.
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limitation expires. Then B moves to intervene in the suit as party plaintiff
along with A. Should the defense of the statute of limitations be good against
B, or should the commencement of A's class action toll the statute for B and
other members of the class who later wish to intervene?
The Supreme Court considered this question in 1887, in Richmond v.
Irons,3 6 and held that B was not barred. In that case, Irons, a judgment
creditor, filed an amended bill as of October 5, 1876, on his own behalf and
on behalf of all creditors who might become parties, against all the stockholders of an insolvent national bank. He asked an accounting and thereafter an assessment against each defendant of his stockholder's liability.
In refusing to limit recovery to those creditors who actually became parties before the period of limitation expired the Court said:
"That amended bill is to be considered from the date of its filing, as
a bill on behalf of all the creditors of the bank who should come in
under it and prove their claims. When any creditor appeared during the
progress of the cause to set up and establish his claim, it was necessary
for him to prove that at the time of filing the bill he was a creditor of
the bank; any defence which existed at that time to his claim, either
to diminish or defeat it, might be interposed either before the master
or on the hearink to the court. The creditor, having established his
claim, became entitled to the benefit of the proceeding as virtually a
party complainant from the beginning, and the time that had elapsed
from the filing of the bill to the proof of his claim would not be' counted
as a part of the time relied on to bar the creditor's right to sue the stockholders. In other words, if he proves himself to be a creditor with a
valid claim against the bank, he becomes a complainant by relation to
the time of the filing of the bill....
"It follows, therefore, that the statute sought to be applied in the present case ceased to run as against the complainants from the date when
the bill was filed, in October, 1876, under which they subsequently established37their right to come in as participants in the benefits of the decree."
In our day the rule of Richvond v. Irons has been re-examined and followed by Judge Frank of the Second Circuit in York v. Guaranty Trust Co.3 8
A class suit had been brought by a noteholder against the indenture trustee,
alleging fraud and misrepresentation in obtaining the noteholders' consent
to a reorganization. Miss York attempted to intervene in that suit, but
36121 U. S. 27, 7 Sup. Ct. 788 (1887).
371d. at 52, 55, 7 Sup. Ct. at 799, 800.
38143 F. 2d 503 (C. C. A. 2d 1944), rezid on other groazeds, 326 U. S. 99, 65 Sup.
Ct. 1464 (1945).
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her application was denied.39 She began her own action several months later,
suing on behalf of herself and other similarly situated noteholders who had
not accepted the reorganization offer, charging a breach by the defendant of
its duties and obligations as indenture trustee and seeking an accounting.
One of the defendant's contentions was that relief could not be granted to
"similarly situated noteholders" against whom, individually, the statute had
I
run.
In discussing this point, Judge Frank cited Richmond v. Irons and quoted
from Dobson v. Simonton"4 as follows:
"It would be a strange anomaly in the law, if it should allow an action
to be brought for a party, and he should thus be encouraged to rely upon it,
and not seek legal redress otherwise than by it, and yet when he came, in
the course of his action, to prove his debt, and share in the fund, to treat
him as having, by such reliance, lost it by the lapse of time, happening
after the bringing of the action. The law will not mislead-it is just
and faithful, and will not tolerate, much 41less uphold, a rule of practice.
that works such injustice and absurdity."
Judge Frank continues:
"As to suits under [Rule 23 (a)] (3) ['spurious'], no less than those
under (1) ['true'] or (2) ['hybrid'], the Rule unequivocally tells all
persons having claims of the type therein described that one or more of
them may begin such a class action 'on behalf of all' when the 'class' is
is 'so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the
court.' Any non-accepting noteholders, relying on that assurance, were
justified in believing that plaintiff's suit was begun on their behalf although they were not before the court. To hold that such noteholders
cannot, as to lapse of time, have the benefit, by intervention, of the
institution of the suit by plaintiff would be to convert the Rule into a
trap." 42
39
Hackner v. Guaranty Trust Co., 117 F. 2d 95 (C. C. A. 2d 1940), cert. denied, 313
U. S. 559, 61 Sup. Ct. 835 (1941).

4093 N. C. 268 (1885).

41143 F. 2d 503, 529 (C.C.A. 2d 1944).

42Ibid. The only d&ision to the contrary we have located isPennsylvania Co. for
Insurances v. Deckert, 123 F. 2d 979 (C. C. A. 3d 1941), where the court said that
if before a "spurious" class suit was begun the statute had already run against, one
who later desired to intervene, the commencement of the class action by another mem-

ber of the class whose right was not barred would not revive the intervenor's right.
Plaintiff sued on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated to enforce the liability of defendant for misrepresentation in the sale of securities, in violation of § 12(2)
of the Securities Act of 1933. The district court, treating the action as a "hybrid" class
suit, ruled against defendant, who appealed and assigned as error, inter alia, the district
court's order permitting the addition of parties-plaintiff whose causes of action should
be considered barred by the provisions of limitation of § 13 of the Securities Act.
The circuit court, despite the fact that the order was interlocutory and not appeal-
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The great procedural virtue of -the class suit, therefore, is that once it is
properly instituted, the other members of the class may intervene in it free
from the bar of the statute of limitations.
And this makes it most important to the profession that we know a class
suit when we see it.
Wljy Not Accept the Invitation in Hansberry v. Lee?
Returning to the comparison of the Ben Hur and Hansberry cases, our
analysis has disclosed the problem that exists. The task is to provide a
procedure that, while allowing a decree which will be res judicata as to
all members of the class with respect to the substantive issues of the case,
nevertheless will conform to the requirements of due process of law.
The objections to making provisions for such a change are well-known.
They are based, usually, on one of two premises-that we must not deprive any litigant of his "day in court", and that we cannot constitutionally
ptovide for a judgment in a "spurious" class suit which will bind persons
other than those participating in the action as parties or as intervenors.
The argument that an individual must not be deprived of his day in court
able except upon final judgment, nevertheless expressed its views upon the order and
upon the application of § 13, and concluded that a member of the class might not intervene as an additional party-plaintiff if he had purchased his securities more than three
years prior to the commencement of the suit. The court reasoned that the suit was a
"spurious", not a "hybrid", suit and that the statute had thus run against those individuals. If, however, the court said, those desiring to intervene could .show fraud and conspiracy to defraud on the part of the defendant, a constructive trust might arise and
the statute would not bar them-for then the situation would be that of a trust coming
to an end, with the necessity of distributing the fund to those equitably entitled to it.
The court also said that if the defendant should turn out to be insolvent and a receiver should be appointed, those individuals whose claims were otherwise held barred
might then intervene. The reasoning: upon appointment of a receiver the suit against
defendant would become a "hybrid" suit and § 13 would no longer be applicable as a bar.
The situation seems no clearer as a result of this decision, and the case does not
seem good authority because it fails to cite and discuss Richmond v. Irons. Further, the
decision is inconsistent with the decisioit of the same circuit in Pentland v. Dravo Corp.,
152 F. 2d 851 (C. C. A. 3d 1945).
Cf. Kalven and Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. oF CHI.
L. REv. 684, 712 n. 88 (1941) : "Where the statute of limitations has run while the suit
is pending, there may be some technical difficulty in allowing participation by the absentees, if their rights are said not to be before the court prior to the running of the
statute. It would seem clear that none of the supposed policies behind the statute support barring of the absentees. The defendant is apprised of the nature of claims of
each and of the probability that it will be enforced against him. It is not a 'stale'
claim, there is no loss of relevant evidence, and finally, little would be gained by
having the absentees intervene at an earlier date in the proceeding. Participation might
be based on the theory that the absentees ratify the plaintiff's suit on their behalf and
that by familiar agency principles the ratification relates back to the date of commencement of the class action. .. ."
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is a shibboleth more emotional than rational when applied to the problems
of class suits. But even accepting it at face value, its weakness in the class
suit field becomes readily apparent when the following considerations are
taken into account:
First, under any plan to extend the binding effect of class suit' judgments
there is no intention of depriving anyone of his day in court. Generally
speaking, anyone interested in the question in issue will be entitled to his
one day in court subject only to the condition that he has enough ambition
43
to go to court and participate in the litigation.
Second, under the present rules governing "spurious"' class suit judgments it is not hard to perceive how an interested person may with a good
deal of truth be said to have two days in court, for he may sit back and
decline to participate in the class suit when it is brought and then later, after
it has been carried through to judgment, sue in his own behalf with the
benefit of full disclosure of his adversary's case.
Third, since the idea of a day in court for everyone is based on the principles of natural justice and fair play, we might well consider the position
of the party opposing the class. Is it fair or just to him to be called upon to
fight a number of suits all turning upon the same identical issue?
Fourth, is it not much fairer to society as a whole-the group that pays
the bills for long-drawn-out and costly litigation-to settle as much as possible in a single suit?
And fifth, touching again upon the theme of justice and fair play, a single
suit whose judgment binds the entire class will afford a much stronger protection against fraudulent suits, bad faith settlements, and phony dismissals
than the present system, for each member of the class will be on his guard
against such tricks lest he find himself bound by them through his failure
appropriately to object to them.
In this connection it might be observed that there seems to be no eminently successful method of fighting collusive settlements of class actions
that does not include calling for and considering the opinion of any member
of the class who might oppose settlement. Refusal by the court to permit
the compromise and settlement of any class action at all has been suggested
but is undesirable on two grounds: (a) that it is not in the interests of justice to close the door to good-faith settlements merely to avoid the collusive
ones, and (b) that it is at best a negative approach, containing no safeguard
43
The matter of multiple counsel fees coming out of a class suit recovery has raised
difficulty in the past and is a topic worthy of separate treatment. It is suggested that
the court should, in its discretion, limit the number of counsel so as to avoid this
danger.
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that the representative who desires to settle but is prohibited from so doing
44
will in good faith put forth his best efforts to win the suit.

Forum Non Conveniens
As desirable as an adequate class suit procedure is, we must, of course,
remember that not every forum is the convenient and desirable one. If the
class suit is to develop as a service to our society, provision should be made
in both the state and federal machinery for transfer of the suit to the most
practicable forum. Otherwise, the maintenance of class suits in far-off
jurisdictions will do harm instead of good.
Pennoyer v. Neff
The constitutional objections to making the class suit judgment binding
on all the class seem a good deal stronger than those based on the supposed
deprivation of a person's "day in court". Indeed at first blush it might
seem an insurmountable task in the face of the constitutional requisites for
due process of law as they were set forth in Pennoyer v. Neff.45 Due process
as there outlined required, first, notice to the parties involved, and, second,
jurisdiction over either parties or res. In class suits where literally hundreds
of members of a class may be scattered anywhere over the 48 states, the
territories, and in foreign countries, the task of obtaining jurisdiction over
them in personam, in the traditional sense, is impossible.
There are two problems-federal class suit procedure and state:
Federal Class Suits. Under Rule 23 as presently written, the question
arises whether a class suit judgment binding on members of the class outside the jurisdiction can be based upon the district court's observing the
caveat in Hansberry v. Lee and giving notice to the absent members.
Certainly the Hansberry case clearly indicates that no judgment will
be binding on members of the class who do not receive notice of the pendency of the action. But does it follow that such notice can, under Pennoyer
v Neff, be effectively given only to such members of the class as are within
the state where the federal district court sits? If this be so, Rule 23 can
have but limited operation in its present form.
44
Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U. S. 204, 65 Sup. Ct. 594 (1945), and Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N. Y. 146, 71 N. E. 2d 443 (1947), held that representative plaintiffs (in a
stockholder's class action and a true stockholder's derivative action, respectively) who
collected money in private compromise and settlement, could be required to account
for it to the corporation. But here again there is no positive safeguard for the interests of the other shareholders since the corporation may recover from the representative plaintiff only what that plaintiff has received.
4595 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1878).
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The better view would seem to be to assume that in drawing Rule 23, the
Supreme Court and the Congress intended that class suits could be maintained so long as the constitutional requirements of due process were observed. The answer to the question whether Rule 23 permits the giving of
notice to nonresident members of the class, and the basing thereon of a
binding judgment, must await a determination by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Since there is no constitutional difficulty involved, the ideal solution federalwise is for the Supreme Court Advisory Committee to anticipate the
point and provide specifically in Rule 23 for the giving of such notice outside
the federal district and outside the state in which the federal district court
sits.

46

State Class Suits. Granted that federal class suits might be maintained
which would end in judgments binding on members of the class absent from
the district and state-either by judicial approval of notice (as called for
by Hansberry v. Lee) given under Rule 23, or by amendment of Rule 23it must be emphasized that such a solution would be only a partial one.
Class suits in the state courts would be no better off.
It is submitted, however, that nationwide service could be provided for
the state courts based on already existing legal principles.
Jurisdiction Based on Notice Alone
The subheading immediately above does not mean that the Fourteenth
Amendment is about to be jettisoned. It is rather a description of the
statin personam jurisdiction obtained under a typical nonresident 4motorist
7
ute and approved by the Supreme Court in Hess v. Pawloski.
The nonresident motorist problem furnishes a good example of the struggle
between a rigid interpretation of Pennoyer v. Neff and the demand of the
public interest. In recognizing and facing the implications of that struggle
the Supreme Court said in the Hess case: •
"In the public interest the state may make and enforce regulations
reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and
non-residents alike, who use its highways. The measure in question
operates to require a non-resident to answer for his conduct in the State
where arise causes of action alleged against him ....

It is required that

he shall actually receive and receipt for notice of the service and a copy
46

The satisfactory manner in which nationwide service has functioned in bankruptcy
and interpleader cases provides strong argument for the change.
47274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 (1927).
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of the process. And it contemplates such continuances as may148be found
necessary to give reasonable time and opportunity for defense.
Due process, in other words, must not prove a stronghold of resistance
to efforts to meet the needs of the public interest.
The Supreme Court in the Hess case stressed the importance 6f the nonresident's answering for his alleged misdeeds in the state where they occurred; but of equal concern to the Court were the requirements of true
due process, and to meet these the nonresident must be given notice and
reasonable opportunity to be heard in defense. Emphasis was laid not on a
technical compliance with due process through service on an agent within
the state (the Secretary of State in most instances), but rather on actual
notice to the defendant. In other words, it was not the ritualistic phrases
in which the legal medicine man uttered the magic formula that persuaded
the Court in the Hess case; instead it was the fact that the basic requirements of due process-notice and opportunity to be heard-were present.
The Court did not-could not-say that service alone on the Secretary of
State satisfied due process. For all the good that service on that official,
without more, does in satisfying due process, we might just as well say that
due process could be met by running around the block three times and shouting "Hallelujah" twice, and this was well brought out in Wuchter v. Pizzuti,4 9 decided the year after the Hess case. In the Wuchter case the
Supreme Court held invalid, as lacking in due process, a statute which provided that service on a nonresident motorist could be effected by serving
the Secretary of State but which contained no other provision making it
reasonably probable that notice of such service would be communicated to
the defendant. Thus the cornerstone of the constitutionality of the nonresident motorist statute is found in the words already quoted:
"It is required that he shall actually receive and receipt for notice of
the service and a copy of the process. And it contemplates such continuances as may be found necessary to give reasonable time and opportunity for defense." 5 °
Perhaps at the time of the Hess case legal thinking was too overawed by
the supposed doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff to bridge with one leap the
long step to providing for service by notice alone, and so it took only the
intermediate step of providing for "serving" the Secretary of State. Legal
innovations must often of necessity be made piecemeal. By now, however,
48

1d. at 356, 47 Sup. Ct. at 633.
49276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct. 259 (1928).
50274 U. S. 352 at 356, 47 Sup. Ct. 632 at 633 (1927).
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the nonresident motorist statutes have become sufficiently integrated into
our legal concepts to allow us to drop the outmoded fiction requiring "service" on the Secretary of State and relieve him of the burden of those formal
documents which he neither sees nor has any interest in and which merely
require additional clerical and filing staffs. To drop an utterly useless procedure would scarcely lay us open to the charge of violating due process.
What the Court did in the Hess case was simply to recognize that negligent drivers were a threat to the order and well-being of society and to
refuse to stand in the way of a state's common-sense method of meeting
that threat.
Applying the foregoing -to the class action problem, it should take no
great imagination to realize that inability properly to adjudicate as to all
members of a class, without multiple actions, is likewise a problem of public
concern and may.in some cases rightly be said to endanger the public interest. The Hess case shows us the remedy, which merely waits to be put to
use: a statutory provision for notice of a type similar to that which the
Supreme Court approved in Hess v. Pawloski could with simplicity be adopted and made available by the states in class suits-and the federal government would not be long in following up with nationwide class suit service.
We are not unaware of the practical problem of expense which this suggestion involves. However, if the large number of members of the class
would render the requirement of notice by registered (or even ordinary)
mail prohibitively expensive, the statute might provide for notice by widespread publication, in the sound discretion of the court. Whether the court
would, in its discretion, permit notice to be given by publication should depend, of course, upon the number of members of the class, the amount involved in the litigation, and the probable effectiveness of the published notice
in reaching the class.
It may be objected at this point that the statute which was upheld in Hess v.
Pawloski made certain that the defendant received notice by requiring the notice to be sent by registered mail, return receipt requested, and that such a
course of procedure is quite different from notice by publication. But consider in this connection New York's nonresident motorist statute, § 52 of
the Vehicle and Traffic Law. This section provides that where registered
mail has been refused upon attempted delivery to the prospective defendant,
the plaintiff may send the required notice by ordinary mail. Were this not
the case, the purpose of the statute would be nullified by the refusal of nonresident motorists to accept any registered mail. 5 ' Quaere, if ordinary mail
51

See alsS N. Y. CIV. PRAc. AcT § 229-b, setting forth similar procedure for serving
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will suffice for due process, would published notice (a constitutional device
already widely used) be held insufficient and unconstitutional were the statute to provide for it as an alternative means in cases where the prospective
defendant refuses to receive even ordinary mail?
It is but the logical step for the several legislatures to furnish a method
for serving notice, or process, on absent members of the class, to provide
them with an opportunity actively to participate in the litigation or in the
alternative to be bound by the actions of those members who do actively participate, and to leave the outcome in the lap of the Supreme Court. Indeed
such a course would seem to be what that Court was impliedly suggesting in
Hansberry v. Lee.
Stresses and strains pervade the whole problem of res judicata where
public policy demands an end to litigation while traditional due process

might insist on a day in court for every man on every claim or defense.52
Perhaps there is no ideal solution to the conflict to be found in our man-made
procedures-yet in the final analysis due process would seem less abused
by holding a class to a final determination, in one fair and adequate hearing,
of its rights and liabilities arising out of the subject of that action, than
by the present alternative of applying stare decisis in assembly-line fashion
in a series of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class.

53

summons on a nonresident natural person doing business in the state. Cf. N. Y. REAL
PROPERTY LAW § 442-g, providing for service on a nonresident real estate broker licensed
to do
business in New York.
52 See Von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YALE L. J. 299 (1929).
5
3Should Congress and the state legislatures fail to act to provide for jurisdiction
by notice alone, it is suggested that the courts themselves could take jurisdiction in rent
by viewing the claim of the class as a res which is brought before the court in its
entirety by those members of the class who are the original parties to the suit. It is
arguable that similar reasoning underlies the Ben Hur case, note 14 supra, and Smith v.
Swormstedt, note 15 supra, ("The legal and equitable rights and liabilities of all being
before the court by representation .

. . .").

Such a view would result in a judgment res

judicata as to all members of the class and yet conforming to the due process requirements of Pennoyer v. Neff.

To assert that the claim or cause of action of a class in any class suit may properly
be thought of as a res is neither illogical nor inappropriate. The very concept of a class
suit must be founded on an acceptance of an idea of "oneness" among those comprising the class. Reasoning from the premise that each class suit has some "oneness" to it,
there would seem to be no fallacy in taking the position that the "oneness" is within the
generally accepted definition of res, and that when the class suit is properly brought
the court has at least in ren jurisdiction over the "oneness". The res might, then,
be brought before the court in the same way that any other intangible res is now brought
before a court of adequate jurisdiction-by an action by one with a claim against or
relating to the res.
Add the requirement that before such an in ren action could be entertained notice
must be given to all members of the class to be affected by the judgment and it is

19481

CLASS ACTIONS
Recommendations

Without waiting for decisive action by Congress, legislatures and courts,
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can
provide the initial impetus toward resolving the present state of confusion
and uncertainty. A redrafting of Rule 23, eliminating any reference to distinctions between types of class actions and providing that in any class
suit there shall be notice to all members of the class, would be of immeasurable help.
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, by proposing a uniform class
suit statute patterned on a model nonresident motorist statute, can offer
equally effective aid in overcoming the present inertia.

NOTE: Through the courtesy of George Wharton Pepper, Esq., The
Editors of the CORNELL LAw QdARTERLY are pleased to present the following letter addressed by him to Professor Arthur John Keeffe concerning this
article, "Lee Defeats Ben Hur". It is felt that Mr. Pepper's comments on
this very controversial subject of class suits are of particular interest and
significance because of his outstanding achievements in the field of federal
procedural reform, particularly as Vice Chairman of the Supreme Court
Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure.
Professor Arthur J. Keeffe,
March 24, 1948
The Cornell Law School,
Ithaca, N4ew York
Dear Professor Keeffe,
Agreeably with my undertaking I took the galleys home last evening and
gave myself the pleasure of reading your article with care.
You argue persuasively for the convenience of a procedure which will make
judgments in (3) and (4) as binding on all individuals as are judgments
in (1) and (2) but you evidently sense the degree of opposition which anybody would encounter who espoused the proposed reform. As a practical
matter, therefore, the question is how much strength there really is in the
position of anticipated opponents. A fair appraisement of the other fellow's
strength is a wise precaution to take before dropping a bomb.
You effectively dispose of the "day in court" objection. That is not much
of a hurdle.
In your discussion of Pennoyer v. Neff and the XIVth Amendment you
submitted that the concepts underlying Pennoyer v. Neff would not be evaded but
rather met and impressed with a new vigor.
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are less effective. This is because you do not come to grips with the
degrees of "process" which are required by different fact-situations. As I
suggested in yesterday's letter, where there is a ready-made bond of association
it is relatively easy to apply the principle' of volunteer representation. Stockholders are already committed to the- representative function of elected directors: it is a short step, in an emergency, to substitute a volunteer. So in the
case of a membership-corporation-a church, for example, or a fraternal
organization. Taxpayers are, perforce, fellow-travellers and their association is essentially a corporation; but the bond of association between them
belongs in the field of political science rather than in the area of voluntary
economic or social effort. They have not joined the lodge or joined the
church; and, in their capacity as taxpayers, they think of themselves not as
associates but merely as victims of a common misfortune. The "process"
that is "due" in their case may therefore easily be thought to be a much more
individual process than otherwise would suffice.
People who have made similar restrictive covenants are associates only
in virtue of that particular circumstance: they may be strangers to one
another, like fellow-passengers who became such by separately buying tickets
for the same train. If a wreck happens and the railroad is to be sued, perhaps there is due to each of them more individual treatment than if they
were already lodge-members en route to the big convention.
What do you think? Is mere notice (whether general or specific) sufficient
to bind X by the judgment entered in a suit by A if A and X have never
consciously associated with one another?
These distinctions, I suppose, are what Moore refers to as "jural relationships". If they are mere distinctions without substantial differences they
ought not to stand in the way of reform. I dislike such a classification as
"true", "hybrid" and "spurious". When one speaks of a class action he
should begin by defining "class". If his definition is broad enough to cover
(1), (2), (3) and (4), that is the end of the matter. If his definition is
too narrow to cover them all, the omitted actions are simply not class actions.
In the latter event they must either be dealt with on some other theory than
that of "class" or they cannot be maintained at all.
Being only 81 years of age I am perhaps more ready for legal adventure
than some of my wiser (and younger) colleagues on the Committee. But
even my spirit of adventure needs to be further quickened by yours before
I can go off the deep end and recommend the sweeping reform that you
advocate.
Faithfully yours,
GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER

